The Calcutta High Court declined to grant an urgent hearing to a petition filed by former West Bengal Minister Aroop Biswas seeking the quashing of a First Information Report lodged against him by Messi GOAT Tour organiser Satadru Datta. The FIR alleged criminal intimidation, and Biswas approached the High Court seeking immediate intervention because he apprehended arrest in connection with the case. The matter was mentioned before a Bench of Justice Saugata Bhattacharya by Senior Advocate Kishore Datta, who urged the Court to list the petition urgently.
During the mentioning of the case, counsel for Biswas emphasized the urgency of the matter and informed the Court that the petitioner feared imminent arrest due to the allegations made in the FIR. It was argued that the incident in question related to an event that had taken place approximately six months earlier and that the FIR had been lodged only recently. Counsel contended that the delay in registering the FIR raised serious questions regarding the case and justified the Court’s immediate attention. He submitted that despite the passage of several months since the event, the complaint had suddenly resulted in the registration of a criminal case, compelling Biswas to seek urgent judicial protection.
The petitioner’s counsel further informed the Court that Biswas had been directed to appear before the Salt Lake Police Station in connection with the investigation. Stressing the gravity of the situation, the counsel argued that the threat of arrest necessitated urgent consideration of the plea seeking quashing of the FIR. According to the submissions made before the Court, the petitioner was facing immediate consequences arising out of the criminal proceedings and therefore required prompt judicial intervention.
In support of the request for urgent listing, counsel pointed out that Biswas’ brother, Swarup Biswas, had already been arrested in connection with the same case. This development, it was argued, heightened the petitioner’s apprehension that he too could face similar coercive action. The counsel submitted that the arrest of the petitioner’s brother demonstrated the seriousness of the threat and justified an expedited hearing of the petition. The argument was advanced that waiting for the matter to proceed through the ordinary listing process could expose the petitioner to arrest before the legality of the FIR could be examined by the Court.
Despite these submissions, the Bench was not persuaded to treat the matter as one requiring urgent consideration. The Court observed that the petition should proceed in accordance with the normal procedure followed by the High Court. Justice Bhattacharya indicated that the matter should be moved in the regular course and would come before the Court through the usual presentation process. The Bench made it clear that it was not inclined to bypass established procedures for listing and hearing such petitions merely on the basis of the apprehensions expressed by the petitioner.
The petitioner’s counsel then sought an earlier listing date and requested that the matter be taken up as soon as the following day. The request was made on the basis of the apprehended arrest and the need for immediate judicial protection. However, the Court did not accept this plea. Instead, the Bench suggested that if the petitioner was concerned about the possibility of arrest, the appropriate legal remedy would be to seek anticipatory bail. The Court indicated that anticipatory bail was specifically designed to address concerns relating to personal liberty and apprehended arrest and therefore constituted the proper avenue for relief in the circumstances presented.
The Bench expressly remarked that the petitioner could move an anticipatory bail application if he feared arrest. By making this observation, the Court signaled that the apprehension of arrest alone was not sufficient to justify urgent listing of a quashing petition. The Court’s response reflected its view that the legal framework already provided a remedy for individuals seeking protection against arrest and that such concerns did not warrant departure from ordinary procedural requirements governing the listing of cases.
Counsel for the petitioner continued to press the issue and questioned the circumstances surrounding the registration of the FIR. It was argued that the FIR had been lodged after a delay of six months and that there was no explanation for why the complaint had not been made earlier. The petitioner’s side contended that such a significant delay cast doubt on the credibility of the allegations and warranted judicial scrutiny. It was also submitted that no preliminary inquiry had been conducted before the registration of the FIR. According to counsel, the absence of such an inquiry, coupled with the unexplained delay, justified the petitioner’s request for quashing of the criminal proceedings.
The petitioner’s counsel maintained that these aspects of the case demonstrated why the High Court should intervene at an early stage. The submission was that the FIR had been registered belatedly and that the circumstances surrounding its registration raised concerns about the propriety of the criminal action. On this basis, the petitioner sought to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction to quash the FIR and terminate the proceedings.
The Bench, however, remained firm in its position that the matter should proceed through the ordinary process. The Court reiterated that the petition should be filed and dealt with in the regular course. Justice Bhattacharya stated that the matter would come up in the presentation form in accordance with established procedure. The Court declined to accord any special treatment to the petition despite the repeated requests made by counsel.
The Bench also expressed concern about the broader implications of entertaining such requests through urgent mentioning. The Court observed that if petitions of this nature were routinely taken up on an urgent basis, the Court would be inundated with similar requests. Justice Bhattacharya emphasized that not all matters could be entertained urgently and that adherence to procedural norms was necessary for the orderly administration of justice. The Court’s observations underscored its reluctance to create a precedent that could lead to a large number of litigants seeking urgent hearings in circumstances where alternative legal remedies were available.
As the hearing continued, counsel once again referred to the arrest of Swarup Biswas and renewed the request for protection against coercive action. The argument remained that the petitioner faced a genuine risk of arrest and therefore required immediate relief from the Court. However, the Bench consistently maintained that anticipatory bail was the proper remedy available under law. The Court reiterated that issues concerning personal liberty and apprehended arrest could be addressed through an anticipatory bail application and that the petitioner should avail himself of that remedy if necessary.
The Bench stated that the petitioner should proceed in accordance with law and seek relief before the appropriate forum. The Court emphasized that another legal forum existed for addressing concerns regarding arrest and that the present petition could not be treated as an urgent matter merely because the petitioner feared coercive action. The Court’s observations reflected a clear distinction between proceedings seeking quashing of an FIR and proceedings seeking protection against arrest. While the former would proceed in the normal course, the latter could be addressed through the statutory mechanism of anticipatory bail.
Towards the conclusion of the mentioning, counsel for the petitioner alleged that the proceedings against Biswas were politically motivated. It was submitted that the actions being taken against the petitioner were driven by political considerations rather than legitimate legal concerns. This contention was placed before the Court as part of the petitioner’s attempt to demonstrate the need for immediate judicial intervention. However, the allegation did not persuade the Bench to alter its position regarding urgent listing.
The Court ultimately declined to grant any urgent relief and refused to list the matter on an expedited basis. The Bench left it open to the petitioner to pursue remedies available under law, including the remedy of anticipatory bail. At the same time, the Court directed that the petition seeking quashing of the FIR should proceed through the normal course of filing and presentation. The Bench maintained throughout the proceedings that established procedures had to be followed and that the matter did not warrant exceptional treatment.
As a result, the petition filed by Aroop Biswas seeking quashing of the FIR was not taken up urgently by the Calcutta High Court. The Court’s decision meant that the petitioner would have to pursue the available legal remedies in accordance with the ordinary processes prescribed by law. While acknowledging the petitioner’s apprehensions regarding arrest, the Court consistently pointed to anticipatory bail as the appropriate mechanism for addressing such concerns and declined to intervene on an urgent basis in the quashing proceedings. The matter was therefore left to proceed through the regular course before the High Court, with the petitioner free to seek any other remedies available under the legal framework.
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