Allahabad High Court: Upholding Freedom of Speech—‘Reasonable Care’ Essential Before Invoking National Integrity Offense

In a powerful and nuanced judgment, the Allahabad High Court has clarified crucial boundaries around invoking national-security offenses under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). The Court emphasized that such provisions, which impose severe penalties including life imprisonment, must not be used indiscriminately. Instead, authorities must exercise “reasonable care” to ensure that any expression being charged directly and clearly threatens India’s sovereignty, unity, or security.

This case arose after an 18‑year‑old individual, Riyaz, posted on social media: “Chahe jo ho jaaye, support to bas Pakistan ka karenge.” Authorities arrested him under Section 152 BNS alleging his message jeopardized national integrity, and also pursued charges under Section 196 for promoting enmity. Representing himself before the High Court, Riyaz challenged the legality of the charges, arguing his words expressed political preference rather than hostility toward India.

Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal presided over the case and conducted a meticulous analysis. He drew upon the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in the Imran Pratapgarhi case, underscoring that freedom of speech and expression is fundamental to democracy and can only be restricted when it endangers public order or national security. The High Court noted that Supreme Court precedent directs caution in national-security prosecutions, ensuring they don’t become tools for suppressing dissent.

The Court emphasized the principle of “reasonable care”—requiring authorities to objectively evaluate:

Whether the words were intended to incite secession or rebellion.
Whether they posed a tangible threat to the nation’s unity or sovereignty.
Whether context or audience suggested potential public disruption.

Where an expression is vague or lacks intent to endanger national integrity, the section cannot be invoked lightly. In Riyaz’s case, the Instagram post simply expressed support for Pakistan without reference to India or any criminal intent. The Court held that such expression, while perhaps objectionable, did not satisfy the conditions for Section 152.

Turning to the charge under Section 196—relating to promoting enmity between groups—the Court again underscored statutory safeguards. Section 173(3) BNS requires police to conduct a preliminary examination before filing an FIR, ensuring there is credible evidence before criminal charges progress. Here, no such inquiry was conducted, rendering the FIR procedurally flawed.

Weighing these factors, the Court concluded that (a) Section 152 was inapplicable due to lack of intent, context, and concrete threat; and (b) Section 196 charges were legally deficient due to missing preliminary inquiry. Noting Riyaz’s young age, clean record, and absence of malicious intent, the Court granted bail, cautioning him against future inflammatory speech that could endanger public order.

The judgment carries wide-reaching implications:

It reinforces the protection of political opinions, however unpopular, as long as they do not fit the criteria of incitement or true threat.
It strengthens procedural safeguards by mandating preliminary inquiry before invoking serious national integrity cases.
It curtails arbitrary or emotional arrests for dissenting speech, reiterating that criminal liability requires more than provocation or offence—it demands intent and real-world threat.
It promotes mature policing and prosecution, urging law enforcement to differentiate between symbolic expression and genuine threats.

This decision strikes an essential balance—protecting individual rights while affirming that national-security laws remain powerful instruments meant for grave offences, not casual invocations. It reminds authorities that in a democracy, even contentious speech must be shielded unless it crosses the threshold of actionable intent.

Ultimately, the Allahabad High Court has set a benchmark for judicial restraint and legal clarity. Its insistence on “reasonable care” ensures that major penalties are reserved for major crimes—not for provocative speech that, once examined, reveals no intent to harm the nation. This verdict will guide future cases, support rights-respecting governance, and protect democratic discourse from undue criminalization.