Patna High Court Reinstates Sessions Judge and Reins in Overreach by Single-judge

In a significant judgment reaffirming judicial propriety, the Patna High Court’s Division Bench, led by Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy, has set aside a controversial order by a fellow High Court judge. That earlier order, issued during a criminal revision, had removed a seasoned Sessions Judge from criminal duties and directed his retraining—steps taken without giving the judge any prior notice or hearing. The Division Bench found that these were administrative and disciplinary actions, beyond the scope of revisional authority, and demanded that the remarks be expunged from the records.

The controversy began when Justice Bibek Chaudhuri, on hearing a revision plea challenging the Sessions Judge’s decision in a cheque-bounce case, sharply criticised the officer’s grasp of criminal law. Specifically, it was found that the judge—despite being designated to handle sessions matters—had incorrectly taken cognisance of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and granted bail without any formal cognisance having been recorded. Since such cases must originate in a magistrate’s court, the High Court under review took strong exception.

Justice Chaudhuri described this error as a grave misunderstanding of basic criminal procedure. The Sessions Judge had exceeded jurisdiction by not sending the matter back to the correct forum and further compounded the error by granting bail prematurely. The High Court found the conduct indicative of a “basic misunderstanding of law”. As a result, the judge ordered that the Sessions Judge be temporarily relieved of all criminal case responsibilities and sent for six months of retraining at the Bihar Judicial Academy.

Though the single-judge raised serious concerns about legal competency, the Division Bench held that such administrative directives are inappropriate in a revisional petition. Revisional authority is limited to correcting judicial errors or reversals of decisions— not imposing training, reassigning duties, or making personality assessments. These were deemed disciplinary measures and the domain of the Chief Justice of the High Court, not a single judge in a case.

The Division Bench emphasised that no such drastic action should have been taken without allowing the Sessions Judge to respond. Section 482 or Chapter pronounced powers in criminal revisions do not permit removal of duties or retraining; those are administrative tools that violate both statutory boundaries and the judge’s right to fair hearing. In doing so, the Bench reaffirmed that principles of natural justice apply even within the judiciary: one cannot be subjected to career-affecting directives without notice or opportunity to be heard.

The court also highlighted several factual inaccuracies in the single-judge’s order. Contrary to the finding that the Sessions Judge had cancelled bail, the Division Bench pointed out that bail was actually cancelled by another judge. This crucial discrepancy undermined the premise that the judge had failed in his judicial function. The single-judge’s order therefore contained errors not just in doctrine but in facts—compounding its unsuitability for record.

Acknowledging the seriousness of the single-judge’s tone, the Division Bench nevertheless urged restraint in language. Courts may sometimes be critical, especially when the performance of judicial officers directly impacts litigants, but remarks should always be tempered and measured. Citing binding precedent, the Bench held that even strong dissatisfaction must be expressed with judicial decorum; harsh personal reputational criticism carries potential to erode trust in the system.

Ultimately, the Division Bench quashed the entire order imposing administrative and disciplinary consequences. It granted no relief on the original revision itself, but struck down the adverse observations, disciplinary orders, and mandatory training directions as “invalid” and “without jurisdiction.” It further directed immediate expungement of these comments from the Sessions Judge’s service record and reminded that any such measures must be taken only through formal institutional channels—not ad hoc case orders.

To balance accountability with procedural integrity, the Bench clarified that the matter could still be referred to the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court if there were lingering concerns about the judge’s performance. The Chief Justice maintains exclusive authority over allocation of cases, training assignments, transfers, and other administrative controls. This reaffirms that judicial administration and personnel matters, while important, cannot be conflated with judicial review of decisions in individual cases.

The judgment serves as a strong reaffirmation of the separation between judicial review and administrative governance. Through this ruling, the Division Bench upheld two important legal principles: first, that revisional powers derive only from the criminal code, not from administrative authority; and second, that judicial officers have a right to be heard before measures affecting their duties or reputation are imposed. This upholds the constitutional guarantee of fair procedure even for judges, reinforcing the rule of law within the judiciary itself.

Furthermore, the Patna High Court’s decision sheds light on the importance of procedural propriety when addressing perceived judicial error. While the competence of judicial officers is always subject to scrutiny, any action must follow institutional rules and established frameworks. The order makes clear that even a judge’s performance must be addressed through agreed-upon channels that honour fairness—removing any temptation for punitive overreach.

The decision also protects the integrity of the Sessions Judge’s record, removing permanent stain from a sudden, severe critique. His continued role in criminal trials will now rely solely on his performance in court and proper evaluation, not sudden and extrajudicial removal from criminal work. This safeguards both his individual reputation and the broader public system that depends on judicial independence.

In conclusion, this ruling is a vital contribution to judicial governance jurisprudence. It reinforces that scrutiny of judicial conduct must remain respectful of established procedure, separation of powers, and constitutional rights—even where legal errors appear glaring. The court’s insistence on corrective but not abusive wording, and its insistence upon procedure, contribute to a culture of accountability rooted in fairness—not reactionary punishment.

By walking back the retraining directive and its attendant criticisms, the Patna High Court re-emphasised that judicial officers, even if mistaken, are owed institutional respect and procedural protection. It clarified the boundaries of judicial authority, emphasizing that legal review and administrative oversight are distinct yet complementary mechanisms—both essential but properly bounded.

As a result of this landmark ruling, several key lessons emerge: judicial errors should be corrected through proper channels; administrative reshuffling must be grounded in procedure and Wholistic judicial administration; and judges deserve natural justice even when judicial performance is questioned. This balance between accountability and procedural fairness strengthens both the judiciary’s independence and its responsibility to maintain public trust.