A batch of writ petitions filed by serving teachers of government and aided schools was dismissed by the Orissa High Court. These teachers challenged the State Government’s decision to revoke or rescind their licenses to act as Registrars of Muslim marriages and divorces under the Orissa Muhammedan Marriages and Divorces Registration Act, 1949 and the Rules framed under it in 1976.
The petitioners argued that there was no prohibition in the 1949 Act or any other relevant statute—including the Odisha Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962—against government teachers serving as Registrars. They contended that their long-standing service as Registrars gave them a right or expectation that their licenses would be renewed or continued.
Justice Dixit Krishna Shripad, however, held that the statute does not confer any absolute right to a license under Section 3 of the Act. This section provides that it is lawful for the State Government to grant a license to any person, which implies that the granting of a license is discretionary. Therefore, government teachers cannot claim as a matter of right that they must always be granted or renewed such a license. The Court noted that a license of this character does not create a public office or vested interest. It is rather a privilege granted by the Government.
The Court also considered the practical consequences and obligations attached to the role of Registrar under the 1949 Act and the 1976 Rules. Registrars must maintain and update registers and records, examine parties and witnesses, and sometimes travel to perform their statutory duties. Rule 49 mandates their personal appearance, along with necessary registers/records, when summoned by a court. The Court expressed concern over whether serving teachers could discharge these onerous responsibilities while simultaneously fulfilling their duties as educators with the requisite commitment.
The Court further observed that their functions carry significant evidentiary weight in marriage and divorce proceedings among Muslims, and involve quasi-judicial powers. Given this background, the Court found that the government’s decision to revoke the licenses cannot be said to be arbitrary simply because there was no express prohibition in the statutes. The State has reasonable grounds for believing that government school teachers may not always be able to perform all of the statutory, quasi-judicial duties imposed on Registrars with the attention and dedication required.
Finally, the High Court addressed the petitioners’ argument that denying renewal or continuation of the license amounts to breach of equal treatment or distributive justice. The Court suggested that there is nothing inconsistent in preferring persons—such as unemployed individuals from the Muslim community—to perform the role of Registrar, so that such appointments might also serve the purpose of distributing opportunities and aligning with constitutional values like distributive justice (including those under Article 39(b) and (c)).
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the writ petitions, upholding the State Government’s decision to debar government/aided school teachers from acting as Registrars of Muslim marriages and divorces.
0 Comments
Thank you for your response. It will help us to improve in the future.