Section 5 of Limitation Act: Entire Delay Period Must Be Explained Before Condonation

The Supreme Court clarified that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, when a litigant seeks condonation of delay for filing after the prescribed limitation period, the explanation must cover the entire duration from the moment the limitation period started until the actual filing date. This means that if, for instance, the law prescribes that an appeal or application must ordinarily be filed within ninety days, but the appeal is filed on the hundredth day, the appellant must explain all one hundred days—not merely the period after expiry of the ninety‐day time frame.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court addressed a divergence in precedent over the interpretation of the phrase “within such period” in Section 5. Some earlier decisions had taken the view that “within such period” refers only to the delay after the expiry of the original limitation period. These included cases such as Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. in which the Court had held that only the period between the expiry and the actual filing needed explanation. On the other hand, counter‐opinions had held that “within such period” must cover both the prescribed limitation period and any delay thereafter, meaning the entire span from when the limitation begins.

A bench consisting of Justices JB Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan examined these conflicting authorities, and after a plain textual reading of Section 5, held decisively in favour of interpreting “within such period” as inclusive of both the prescribed limitation period and any additional delay. The Court observed that neither the text of Section 5 nor supporting precedents justify limiting the explanation requirement only to the period following the expiry of limitation.

Thus, in the Supreme Court’s view, the earlier approach—which would require explanation only for the delay after the limitation period—was inconsistent with the statute. The Court stated that “there can be no question” of reading the phrase “within such period” as referring exclusively to either just the original limitation period or just the period of delay after it; both are necessarily included.

The case which gave rise to this ruling was Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. v. Karnataka Housing Board. In the litigation, the issue was whether the delay could be condoned when only the period after expiry was explained. The Court held that this approach was incorrect and that the entire delay must be accounted for.

In addition, the Court dealt with delays caused by state agencies or administrative lethargy. The Court made clear that delays attributable to government or administrative bodies, even if arising from procedural or bureaucratic deadlock, ought not be automatically condoned unless there is a satisfactory explanation. The burden to show “sufficient cause” extends over the entire period, regardless of the source of delay.

In sum, the Supreme Court’s judgment establishes that condonation under Section 5 requires explaining all days from the beginning of the limitation period up to the actual date of filing. Partial explanations restricted to only the post-limitation delay are insufficient.