The Karnataka High Court has set aside a notification which cancelled the appointment of an Additional District Government Pleader just 24 hours after it was made, terming the sudden cancellation a grossly arbitrary exercise of power. The Court declared that although the government may appoint pleaders at its pleasure under the relevant statutory rules, that “pleasure” is not unfettered — it must conform to constitutional guarantees, particularly the guarantee against arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution.
The case arose when an advocate was appointed Additional District Government Pleader at XI Additional District and Sessions Court, Belagavi (sitting at Athani). The appointment was issued on a certain date, and the advocate assumed charge, appearing in court. Within 24 hours, however, the State’s Department of Law issued a fresh notification cancelling that appointment and appointed another advocate in his place, citing a minister’s note (“tippani”) as the cause. The petitioner challenged this abrupt cancellation by filing a writ petition.
The State contended that such appointments, under Rules 26 and 28 of the Karnataka Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977, are made at the pleasure of the Government, and that the withdrawal of the appointment was therefore legitimate and within its rights. It argued that no legal right was taken away outside that pleasure.
In its judgment, Justice M. Nagaprasanna — after perusing the records — observed that though the Rules provide for appointment at the government’s pleasure, this power cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The Court emphasized that the constitutional principle under Article 14 requires that any state action must not be arbitrary, and that fairness and legitimate expectation must guide governmental decisions. In the present case, the appointment had been made in accordance with law; there was no defect in procedure, no statutory disqualification, and no administrative exigency or public interest that necessitated the abrupt cancellation within 24 hours.
The Court noted the stark facts: the appointment was made, the pleader assumed charge, and appeared in court — only for the State to reverse itself the next day without reason, merely based on a ministerial note. The sudden change of mind cannot be labelled as administrative exigency; it is plainly capricious. The Court stated that if such removal were permitted without reason, the doctrine of pleasure would become a licence for arbitrary executive action, eroding constitutional safeguards.
The Court declared the cancellation notification void. It ordered restoration of the petitioner’s appointment as Additional District Government Pleader, effectively reinstating him to the position from which he was removed. The subsequent appointment of the other advocate was nullified. The Court thereby affirmed that even appointments made at government pleasure must survive constitutional scrutiny and cannot be withdrawn on impulse or whim.
This decision underscores that though statutory rules vest the government with the power to appoint or withdraw Government Pleaders, such powers are subject to constitutional constraints. Arbitrary revocation of valid appointments — particularly within a day of making them — cannot be allowed under the guise of pleasure, and courts must intervene where such actions violate basic fairness and equality before law.
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