The Allahabad High Court has held that an advocate’s exoneration in disciplinary proceedings before a Bar Council does not automatically entitle them to the quashing of a pending criminal case. The Court made it clear that disciplinary action under the Advocates Act and prosecution under criminal law operate in entirely separate spheres, with distinct purposes, procedures and standards of proof. Therefore, the outcome of one cannot control or negate the other.
The case involved a petition filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code by an advocate who sought to quash a summoning order issued in a criminal case registered under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint alleged that the advocate had received over six lakh rupees from a client on the promise of securing a favourable order and had thereby committed fraud. Before the criminal case progressed, the same allegations had been brought before the Bar Council, resulting initially in an ex-parte decision suspending the advocate for five years. When this order was later recalled and the complaint dismissed, the advocate was effectively exonerated in the disciplinary inquiry.
Relying on this outcome, the advocate argued before the High Court that the criminal proceedings had become redundant and constituted an abuse of process. He contended that once a competent disciplinary body had dismissed the allegations, forcing him to face a criminal trial for the same accusations would be unjustified and oppressive.
The High Court rejected this contention. It explained that disciplinary proceedings under the Advocates Act are intended to uphold professional standards, dealing with questions of misconduct or ethical breaches. Criminal proceedings, however, focus on offences against the law and society. The Court noted that the evidentiary threshold in disciplinary inquiries is significantly different from that in criminal prosecutions, and therefore a finding in one forum cannot conclusively determine the outcome in the other. Because each process serves its own legal purpose, both may validly continue at the same time.
The Court further observed that its inherent power to quash criminal proceedings must be used sparingly and only where the allegations are frivolous, malicious or entirely unsupported by material. In this case, the complaint and accompanying statements provided sufficient prima facie grounds to justify the summoning order. The Court therefore found no exceptional circumstance warranting interference.
Emphasising the independence of criminal prosecution from professional disciplinary action, the Court concluded that a favourable outcome in the Bar Council proceedings does not confer immunity from criminal liability. It accordingly dismissed the petition to quash the criminal case, reaffirming that disciplinary exoneration cannot be used as a shield against the operation of criminal law.
0 Comments
Thank you for your response. It will help us to improve in the future.