The Supreme Court held that clearance for cutting trees must adhere to the definition of “forest” as laid down in the landmark Godavarman decision, even where the land on which the trees stand has not been formally notified as a forest. The Constitution Bench clarified that the word “forest” in environmental and forestry jurisprudence must be understood in the broad sense explained in the Godavarman judgment, which extends beyond legally notified forest land to include all areas that possess forest characteristics and are recorded as forests in government records or maps. The Bench observed that the essence of the Godavarman interpretation is to ensure comprehensive protection for forest ecosystems and tree cover, and to prevent circumvention of conservation norms through mere technical classifications or lack of formal notification.
The dispute before the Court related to a challenge against orders permitting the felling of trees on land that was not notified as forest under any statutory scheme. Petitioners contended that since the land did not enjoy the status of “forest land” on the basis of statutory notification, the statutory regime applicable to forests and tree cutting did not apply. They argued that permissions granted by authorities to cut trees on non-notified land were valid and did not require compliance with the stringent safeguards applicable to forest land under the Godavarman framework.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention, explaining that the definition of “forest” for the purpose of tree protection and environmental law must be expansive. It noted that the Godavarman decision construed the term to cover a variety of recorded forest areas, including those not formally notified as forests under specific forest statutes, in order to prevent arbitrary removal of tree cover and ecological degradation. The Court held that what matters is the ecological character and classification of the land as forest in government records, rather than a narrow focus on whether a formal notification under a specific statute exists.
In elaborating its reasoning, the Supreme Court emphasised that the objective behind extending the definition of “forest” is rooted in the constitutional mandate to protect the environment and maintain ecological balance. The broader interpretation serves to bring within the ambit of protective regimes those areas that, although not notified, perform ecological functions akin to forests, including biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, and watershed protection. The Court noted that limiting the application of forest protection principles only to formally notified lands would create loopholes that could be exploited, undermining environmental safeguards and rendering statutory protections ineffective.
The Bench clarified that authorities empowered to grant permissions for tree cutting must consider whether the land falls within the ambit of the Godavarman definition of “forest.” If trees are situated on land that, in substance and character, qualifies as forest under this interpretative framework, then permissions must comply with the procedural and substantive safeguards mandated by law, including environmental clearances and forestry oversight, irrespective of the formal notification status. The Court observed that this approach is in keeping with the underlying purpose of environmental jurisprudence and the need to ensure uniform application of protective norms.
The Supreme Court also underscored the importance of preventing arbitrary or ad hoc permissions for tree felling that could threaten ecological equilibrium. It noted that tree cover in non-notified forest areas contributes significantly to environmental quality and ecological stability, and that indiscriminate clearance without appropriate safeguards could have far-reaching adverse impacts. The Court highlighted the connection between tree protection and broader environmental governance, pointing out that tree cover loss has implications for climate change, soil erosion, water resources, and local livelihoods, and that statutory and constitutional obligations must be interpreted to uphold these public interests.
In concluding its judgment, the Supreme Court held that the definitions and principles laid down in the Godavarman decision govern the legal regime for tree cutting permissions, whether the land is notified as forest or not. It directed that authorities must treat tree cutting permission applications on the basis of this comprehensive understanding of “forest,” ensuring that protective measures, procedural requirements, and environmental considerations are fully observed. Permissions granted without regard to these principles must be re-examined to ascertain compliance with the law.
The Supreme Court’s ruling reinforces the expansive scope of forest protection jurisprudence in India. By linking tree cutting permissions to the Godavarman definition of “forest,” the Court emphasized that environmental safeguards apply broadly to ecological assets that qualify as forests in character and record, and not solely on the basis of formal statutory notification. The decision aligns legal practice with constitutional mandates for environmental conservation and underscores the judiciary’s role in preventing erosion of ecological protection through narrow statutory interpretations.
0 Comments
Thank you for your response. It will help us to improve in the future.