The Allahabad High Court has taken up an important jurisdictional issue concerning the power to entertain applications under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which relates to the extension of time for arbitral tribunals to render their awards. The issue arose in proceedings where an application was filed seeking extension of the mandate of an arbitral tribunal whose time to make an award had expired. Section 29A provides that an arbitral award must ordinarily be made within a stipulated period, failing which the mandate of the tribunal terminates unless extended by a “Court.” The controversy before the High Court centred on the meaning of the term “Court” and whether the Allahabad High Court, which does not ordinarily exercise original civil jurisdiction, can entertain such applications.
The statutory framework of the Arbitration Act defines “Court” as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes a High Court only if it exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction. This definition has created uncertainty in jurisdictions where High Courts do not possess such original civil jurisdiction. In the matter before the Allahabad High Court, this ambiguity became pronounced because the arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court itself under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. The question therefore arose whether the same High Court could also extend the time for making the award under Section 29A, or whether such an application must necessarily be filed before the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, such as the District Judge or a designated commercial court.
The issue was further complicated by conflicting decisions rendered earlier by different benches of the Allahabad High Court. In one case, a Single Judge had held that since the Allahabad High Court does not have ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it cannot act as the “Court” for the purposes of Section 29A. According to this view, applications seeking extension of time for arbitral awards must be filed before the district-level civil courts, irrespective of whether the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court. This interpretation was based on a strict reading of the statutory definition of “Court” under the Arbitration Act.
However, a contrary view was taken in another decision, where a Single Judge held that when the High Court appoints an arbitrator under Section 11, it should logically also have the authority to extend the arbitral tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A. This reasoning was based on the functional relationship between the two provisions. The court observed that it would be anomalous if a district court were empowered to extend the mandate of, or even substitute, an arbitrator appointed by the High Court. According to this interpretation, the term “Court” in Section 29A should be understood contextually, allowing the appointing High Court to exercise jurisdiction even if it does not ordinarily have original civil jurisdiction.
Yet another bench took a position aligned with the stricter statutory interpretation, holding that the definition of “Court” under the Arbitration Act leaves no room for deviation. It concluded that unless a High Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it cannot entertain applications under Section 29A, regardless of its role in appointing the arbitrator. This divergence of views within the same High Court led to uncertainty and inconsistency in the application of the law.
In light of these conflicting interpretations, the Allahabad High Court referred the issue to a larger bench for authoritative resolution. The reference seeks clarity on whether applications under Section 29A should be entertained by the court that appointed the arbitrator under Section 11, or whether jurisdiction is strictly confined to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction as defined under the Act. The reference also raises questions about how Section 29A should operate in cases where arbitrators are appointed by parties themselves or through statutory mechanisms, without the involvement of a court.
The reference underscores the practical significance of the issue, as Section 29A not only empowers courts to extend the time for making an arbitral award but also authorises them to substitute arbitrators in appropriate cases. Determining which forum has this power directly affects the functioning of arbitral proceedings and the balance of authority between High Courts and subordinate courts. The High Court’s decision to place the matter before a larger bench reflects the need for doctrinal clarity and uniformity in the interpretation of arbitration law.
By referring the question, the Allahabad High Court has acknowledged the broader implications of the issue for arbitration practice, particularly in jurisdictions where High Courts lack original civil jurisdiction. The outcome of the reference is expected to settle the law on whether the role of appointing arbitrators under Section 11 carries with it an implied power to extend their mandate under Section 29A, or whether such powers are strictly governed by the statutory definition of “Court.” The decision of the larger bench will have a significant bearing on future arbitration proceedings and the procedural route available to parties seeking extension of time for arbitral awards.
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