The Supreme Court has held that the exoneration of a public servant in departmental disciplinary proceedings does not, by itself, justify quashing a criminal prosecution on the same charge, particularly in corruption cases arising from trap operations, and emphasised that disciplinary and criminal processes operate independently with different standards of proof. A bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice K Vinod Chandran allowed an appeal filed by the Karnataka Lokayukta and set aside a judgment of the Karnataka High Court which had quashed criminal proceedings against an Executive Engineer accused of demanding and accepting a bribe. The case originated from allegations that the Executive Engineer (Electrical) of Hubli Electricity Supply Company (HESCOM) at Bagalkot demanded a bribe from a contractor for clearing pending bills. On receiving a complaint, the Anti-Corruption Bureau laid a trap, recovered tainted currency notes from the officer’s possession, and recorded positive results in the phenolphthalein test. Both departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecution were initiated, but the departmental enquiry ended in the officer’s exoneration. The officer then moved the High Court seeking to quash the criminal case on the basis that if the charge could not be proved in the departmental enquiry, which involves a lower standard of proof on the balance of probabilities, it could not succeed in a criminal trial that requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court accepted this argument and quashed the criminal proceedings.
In reversing the High Court’s decision, the Supreme Court clarified that the mere fact of exoneration in a disciplinary enquiry does not invalidate criminal proceedings, as the two forums have distinct purposes and standards of proof. Disciplinary enquiries focus on misconduct from a service perspective and assess allegations on the preponderance of probabilities, whereas criminal prosecutions determine penal liability through proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court distinguished the present case from an earlier three-judge decision in Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, which had been relied upon by the High Court. In Radheshyam Kejriwal, the exoneration in adjudication proceedings under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was held to vitiate the criminal prosecution because both adjudication and prosecution were under the same statute by the same authority. The Supreme Court in the present appeal held that such reasoning could not be extended broadly to all cases where there is a civil or disciplinary exoneration alongside a criminal prosecution, noting that the contexts and statutory frameworks differ significantly. The bench referred to established precedent that exoneration in departmental proceedings does not ipso facto lead to the quashing of criminal prosecution, especially in bribery trap cases conducted by independent investigating agencies.
The Court also examined the enquiry report from the departmental proceedings and observed that the exoneration there had resulted from procedural deficiencies, including the failure to examine the trap-laying officer as a witness, rather than a finding on the merits of the allegations. The Supreme Court noted that such procedural lapses in departmental enquiries cannot pre-empt criminal trials, where courts have broader powers to secure evidence and examine witnesses. The bench further recorded that the complainant and two independent witnesses had repeatedly supported the prosecution version regarding the demand, acceptance, and recovery of bribe money. Based on the totality of circumstances and legal principles, the Supreme Court allowed the criminal prosecution to continue, setting aside the High Court’s order that had quashed the proceedings. The Court clarified that while the concluded disciplinary proceedings could not be reopened, any conviction in the criminal case would have service consequences under applicable rules, a matter already reserved by the disciplinary authority. The Supreme Court’s ruling reaffirmed that exoneration in disciplinary proceedings does not automatically bar criminal prosecution on the same charge in all situations, recognising the independent and distinct nature of these two legal processes.
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