Kerala High Court Rules That Confession Made to Police by One Accused Cannot by Itself Support Conviction of Co-Accused Without Independent Evidence

 

The Kerala High Court reaffirmed the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that a confession made to police by one accused cannot, in itself, form the basis for convicting a co-accused unless there is independent incriminating evidence connecting the co-accused to the offence. The Court allowed a criminal revision petition filed by an individual convicted for theft under the Indian Penal Code, concluding that the material on record was insufficient to sustain the conviction of the revision petitioner and that reliance on a police confession made by the other accused was legally impermissible in the absence of corroborative proof. The case arose from an incident in which a motorcycle was allegedly stolen, and the first accused, apprehended by police, purportedly confessed to committing the offence along with the second accused, the petitioner, implicating both in the theft. The prosecution thereafter prosecuted both accused, and the trial court found both guilty, recording conviction and sentence under the relevant provisions relating to theft.

Before the High Court, the revision petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence on the ground that the prosecution had failed to produce any independent evidence connecting him to the commission of the theft. It was argued that aside from the statement attributed to the first accused—tendered before the police—the prosecution had not established any direct link between the petitioner and the theft, and that the confession made to police was inadmissible and legally incapable of grounding conviction. The High Court examined the principles governing admissibility of confession statements under the Evidence Act, particularly Sections 25 and 30, along with the corresponding provisions in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, to assess whether the confession could be considered against the co-accused for purposes of sustaining a conviction.

The Court noted that Section 25 of the Evidence Act places an absolute prohibition on proving confessions made to police officers, whether or not the confession was voluntary, and that such confessions cannot be read into evidence against the person who made them. It further observed that Section 30 of the Evidence Act allows a court to take into consideration a confession by an accused in a joint trial against a co-accused only when the confession is legally admissible and duly proved. The Court emphasised that the provisions permitting use of confession against a co-accused are contingent upon the confession itself being admissible; if a confession made to police is inadmissible under Section 25, then that confession cannot be “proved” within the meaning of Section 30. Accordingly, a confession that is excluded by statutory bar cannot, by extension, be utilised against another accused simply because of its implicatory content, and may only be used if supported by other admissible, independent evidence.

In applying these principles to the facts before it, the High Court observed that apart from the alleged confession attributed to the first accused by police witnesses, there was no primary evidence linking the revision petitioner to the theft of the motorcycle. The prosecution had neither produced the original motorcycle as part of recovered stolen property connected to the second accused nor presented eyewitness testimony placing the petitioner in possession of the stolen vehicle at the relevant time. In the absence of such corroborative or independent evidence, the Court held that the confession attributed to the first accused could not be relied upon to establish the guilt of the petitioner. The Court further reiterated that confessions under the Evidence Act are not treated as substantive evidence under the statutory definition of “evidence” and that reliance on such statements without independent corroboration undermines the requirement that guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt based on admissible, credible evidence.

The High Court also underscored the settled legal doctrine that a conviction cannot rest exclusively on uncorroborated statements such as confessions made to police, and that criminal trials require tangible proof to connect an accused to the alleged offence. Drawing on precedent principles, the Court noted that although a voluntary confession by an accused person may carry some inherent probability, the statutory bar against admitting confessions made to police remains absolute under the Evidence Act, and judicial discretion cannot be invoked to substitute prohibited material for admissible evidence. Given the prosecution’s failure to produce any independent incriminating material against the petitioner, the High Court concluded that no “grave suspicion” or prima facie case was made out to justify his conviction, and that the revision petition deserved to be allowed.

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the revision, set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner for theft, and ordered his acquittal. The judgment reinforces the well-settled legal position that confessions made to police cannot be used as substantive proof in a criminal trial and that the prosecution must adduce independent evidence to sustain conviction, particularly where a co-accused’s statement is sought to implicate another person. It affirms the principle that statutory safeguards governing admissibility of evidence must be scrupulously followed to uphold the rights of an accused and to ensure that convictions are grounded in credible, legally admissible proof rather than on uncorroborated statements attributed to other participants in an alleged crime.

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