The Supreme Court held that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 does not permit the State to impose an upper limit on the percentage of disability for the purpose of reservation, ruling that such a restriction is contrary to the statutory scheme and the objectives of the legislation. The Court clarified that the law prescribes only a minimum threshold for identifying eligible candidates and does not authorize exclusion of persons with higher levels of disability, as long as they are capable of performing the duties of the post with reasonable accommodation.
The case arose from a recruitment process for the post of Assistant District Attorney in Himachal Pradesh, where certain posts were reserved for persons with disabilities. The recruitment notification restricted eligibility to candidates with disabilities ranging between 40 percent and 60 percent. The appellant, who had a locomotor disability assessed at 90 percent, applied under the reserved category and successfully cleared the examination as well as the interview process. Despite being recommended for appointment, he was denied the position solely because his disability exceeded the upper limit specified in the notification.
The appellant challenged the decision, but the High Court upheld the restriction imposed by the State. The matter was subsequently brought before the Supreme Court, where the central issue was whether the State could legally prescribe an upper ceiling on the percentage of disability for reservation eligibility under the statutory framework.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the concept of “benchmark disability” under the Act is defined by a minimum threshold of 40 percent, which serves as the qualifying criterion for availing benefits such as reservation. The Court emphasized that the statute establishes a floor for eligibility and does not provide for any upper ceiling that would disqualify individuals with higher degrees of disability.
The Court observed that by prescribing a maximum limit of 60 percent, the State had effectively narrowed the scope of the law and excluded a category of persons who are otherwise entitled to protection and benefits under the Act. It held that such a restriction amounts to altering the statutory definition and undermines the legislative intent of promoting inclusion and equal opportunity.
In its reasoning, the Court highlighted that the principle of reasonable accommodation lies at the core of the Act. It stated that the suitability of a candidate must be assessed based on their functional ability to perform the duties associated with the post, rather than being determined solely by the percentage of disability. The Court noted that a higher degree of disability does not necessarily indicate incapacity, particularly where appropriate accommodations can be made to enable effective performance.
The Court also examined the nature of the duties of an Assistant District Attorney and found that the role primarily involves legal work such as conducting cases, providing legal advice, and appearing in court. It observed that these functions rely more on intellectual and professional competence than on physical abilities that would be affected by locomotor disability.
Taking into account the appellant’s experience as a practicing advocate, the Court noted that he had been successfully discharging professional responsibilities despite his disability. It concluded that his performance in the selection process further demonstrated his capability and suitability for the post.
The Court held that the denial of appointment solely on the basis of exceeding the prescribed disability limit was arbitrary and violated principles of equality and non-discrimination. It observed that excluding a candidate who had otherwise qualified on merit and demonstrated competence amounted to unjust discrimination.
The judgment also addressed the reasoning adopted by the High Court and clarified that the statutory framework and subsequent developments in disability rights law emphasize inclusion and reasonable accommodation. It held that any restriction not supported by the Act and not connected to the actual requirements of the job would be legally unsustainable.
The Court concluded that the imposition of an upper ceiling on disability percentage lacked any rational connection to the duties of the post and was inconsistent with the purpose of the law. It reiterated that the Act seeks to ensure equal participation of persons with disabilities and that administrative conditions cannot override statutory rights.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed the State to appoint the appellant to the post of Assistant District Attorney. It ordered that the appointment be granted with retrospective effect for the purpose of notional benefits. In the event that the vacancy was no longer available, the Court directed the creation of a supernumerary post to accommodate him.
The Court also imposed costs on the State, recognizing that the appellant had been subjected to prolonged denial of employment due to an unlawful restriction. The judgment underscores that the benefits conferred under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act cannot be curtailed by administrative measures that are not grounded in the statutory framework and reinforces the principle that eligibility must be determined by capability and supported through reasonable accommodation rather than restricted by arbitrary limits.
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