Solicitor General Tushar Mehta told the Supreme Court that it is factually incorrect to state that Hindu law is based on the Manusmriti, asserting that such a characterisation oversimplifies the evolution of Hindu jurisprudence and ignores the dominant legal traditions followed across most of India. Appearing before a Constitution Bench during hearings involving questions relating to Hindu religious law, Mehta explained that Hindu law has evolved through multiple sources, commentaries, and schools of interpretation rather than being derived exclusively from a single ancient text. His submissions sought to clarify what he described as a widespread misconception regarding the historical foundations of Hindu personal law.
The Solicitor General explained that Hindu law historically developed from the Smritis, which are ancient legal and ethical treatises, and from authoritative commentaries written by distinguished jurists over several centuries. According to him, the evolution of Hindu jurisprudence demonstrates a dynamic legal tradition in which successive scholars interpreted and adapted earlier texts to changing social conditions. Consequently, modern Hindu law cannot be understood merely by referring to one ancient scripture without considering the broader legal framework that emerged through subsequent scholarly interpretation.
A major focus of Mehta's submissions was the distinction between the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools of Hindu law, the two principal schools that historically governed matters such as inheritance and succession in different parts of India. He pointed out that the Mitakshara school, authored by the jurist Vijnaneshwara and based upon the Yajnavalkya Smriti, has traditionally been followed across most parts of the country. By contrast, the Dayabhaga school, which historically prevailed mainly in Bengal and parts of Assam, drew upon different textual traditions, including the Manusmriti in certain respects. Therefore, according to Mehta, it is historically inaccurate to suggest that Hindu law throughout India rests solely upon the Manusmriti.
Elaborating on the distinction between these schools, the Solicitor General observed that the Dayabhaga system linked inheritance rights more closely with the performance of 'pind daan', the ritual offering made to deceased ancestors during shraddha ceremonies. He described this approach as comparatively restrictive. The Mitakshara school, on the other hand, developed a different legal framework for succession and coparcenary rights, which eventually became the predominant system governing Hindu law across most regions of India. This historical evolution, he argued, demonstrates that Hindu jurisprudence has always accommodated multiple interpretative traditions rather than adhering uniformly to one text.
Mehta further submitted that even the Vedas, though revered as foundational religious texts, are not direct sources of enforceable Hindu law. He explained that Hindu jurisprudence gradually evolved through Smritis, commentaries, judicial interpretation, customs, and legislative developments. Ancient jurists examined earlier principles and formulated legal doctrines suitable for practical application, thereby creating an evolving legal system rather than a rigid or immutable code. According to him, this ability to reinterpret legal principles illustrates the flexibility inherent in Hindu legal thought.
The Solicitor General emphasized that the historical development of Hindu law bears little resemblance to the perception that it is founded upon a single religious manuscript. Instead, he described Hindu jurisprudence as a layered and evolving body of legal principles shaped by multiple scholarly contributions over centuries. This process of legal evolution enabled Hindu law to adapt to changing social realities while retaining continuity with earlier traditions. Such adaptability, he argued, explains why different schools of Hindu law emerged and coexisted across various regions of the country.
During the course of his submissions, Mehta also highlighted the distinction between religious texts and legal sources. While religious scriptures may influence ethical and philosophical thought, not every sacred text automatically constitutes a binding legal source. Hindu law, he submitted, evolved through recognised juristic commentaries and accepted schools of legal interpretation, which were subsequently acknowledged and applied in judicial decisions during both the pre-colonial and colonial periods before being substantially codified through post-Independence legislation.
The arguments were made in the broader context of proceedings before the Supreme Court involving constitutional questions relating to Hindu religious law and legal traditions. Although Mehta's observations addressed historical aspects of Hindu jurisprudence, they were intended to assist the Constitution Bench in understanding the evolution of legal principles rather than to determine the final outcome of the pending case. The Court did not pronounce upon the correctness of these historical propositions during the hearing, and the matter remains pending for adjudication.
The submissions also underline the distinction between classical Hindu law and modern statutory Hindu law. Following Independence, Parliament enacted comprehensive legislation such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. These enactments codified substantial portions of Hindu personal law, replacing or modifying many traditional rules while creating a uniform statutory framework applicable to large sections of the Hindu community. Consequently, contemporary Hindu personal law is governed primarily by legislation enacted by Parliament rather than solely by ancient legal texts.
The discussion before the Supreme Court also reflects the importance of historical accuracy when interpreting India's legal traditions. Legal systems often evolve over centuries through legislation, judicial decisions, scholarly interpretation, and customary practices. Mehta's submissions sought to emphasize that Hindu law represents one such evolving legal tradition whose present form cannot be understood through reference to a single ancient text in isolation. The historical contribution of various jurists, schools of interpretation, and legislative reforms collectively shaped the legal principles applied today.
The Solicitor General's observations are likely to contribute to broader academic and legal discussions concerning the sources and development of Hindu jurisprudence. The distinction between the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools has long occupied an important place in the study of Indian personal laws, particularly in matters relating to inheritance, succession, and family law. His submissions reiterate that historical legal traditions must be examined within their broader doctrinal and regional context rather than through generalized assumptions.
In conclusion, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta told the Supreme Court that it is factually incorrect to describe Hindu law as being based solely on the Manusmriti, arguing that the dominant Mitakshara school derives from the Yajnavalkya Smriti and that Hindu jurisprudence evolved through multiple Smritis, scholarly commentaries, customs, and later statutory reforms. His submissions underscored the historical diversity and evolutionary character of Hindu law while clarifying that modern Hindu personal law reflects centuries of legal development culminating in comprehensive parliamentary codification after Independence.
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