The Karnataka High Court has strongly criticized the extraordinary delay in the trial of a case involving the alleged sexual assault of a six-year-old child, observing that the victim had been "held captive to the criminal justice system" for more than twelve years because of repeated and unjustified adjournments. Justice M. Nagaprasanna, while disposing of a writ petition arising from the proceedings, described the prolonged pendency as "deeply disquieting" and held that every unnecessary adjournment in a case involving a child victim amounts to a continuation of the injustice already suffered by the victim. The Court directed the Special POCSO Court to conclude the trial within eight weeks and instructed it not to entertain unwarranted requests for adjournments.
The case arose out of an incident that allegedly occurred in 2014, when a six-year-old girl studying in a school in Bengaluru was subjected to sexual assault. Following investigation, the police filed a charge sheet against the accused for offences punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4, 6, and 21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. Although the POCSO Act envisages expeditious disposal of such cases, the trial remained pending for over a decade due to repeated adjournments and procedural delays. The prolonged pendency prompted the victim's father to approach the High Court seeking intervention for speedy disposal of the trial.
Apart from seeking an early conclusion of the proceedings, the petitioner challenged an order of the Special Court refusing to summon the Judicial Magistrate who had recorded the child's statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The petitioner argued that the Magistrate's evidence had become necessary because the recorded statement did not bear the signatures of either the child victim or the Magistrate. According to the petitioner, unless the Magistrate was examined, the authenticity and evidentiary value of the statement could be questioned during trial.
While examining the issue, the High Court first addressed the legal position governing statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC. Justice Nagaprasanna observed that the POCSO Act recognizes the vulnerability of child victims and therefore adopts procedures intended to minimize further trauma. The Court noted that the law does not require a child victim to sign a statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC, and this omission is a deliberate legislative choice rather than an accidental gap in the statute. A child victim may be too young to understand the significance of a signature or may still be suffering the psychological effects of the offence. Consequently, the absence of the child's signature does not invalidate the statement or render it legally inadmissible.
The Court further explained that statements recorded before a Magistrate enjoy a presumption of regularity because they constitute official judicial acts performed in accordance with statutory procedure. Ordinarily, such statements are proved during trial through the witness who made them. The Magistrate need not be summoned merely because one of the parties entertains doubts regarding procedural formalities or seeks to test the authenticity of the document. Summoning judicial officers as witnesses should remain an exception rather than the rule.
Justice Nagaprasanna clarified that a Magistrate who records a statement under Section 164 CrPC may be summoned only in exceptional circumstances, particularly where the witness completely denies having made the statement or disputes its correctness. In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, compelling judicial officers to enter the witness box would unnecessarily interfere with judicial functioning and undermine the presumption attached to official judicial acts. Accordingly, the High Court upheld the Special Court's refusal to summon the Magistrate.
Having resolved the procedural issue, the Court turned its attention to the much larger concern regarding the extraordinary delay in the trial. Justice Nagaprasanna observed that the case represented a disturbing example of how repeated adjournments can erode the very purpose of special legislation enacted for the protection of children. The Court remarked that every adjournment granted without compelling justification not only postpones a hearing but also prolongs the trauma experienced by the child victim, who remains entangled in the criminal justice process instead of obtaining closure. According to the Court, justice delayed in such cases becomes a continuing injustice rather than a mere procedural lapse.
The High Court referred to Section 35(2) of the POCSO Act, which contemplates that trials under the Act should ordinarily be completed within one year from the date on which the Special Court takes cognizance of the offence. The Bench observed that the legislative intent behind prescribing this time frame is to protect child victims from prolonged litigation and repeated exposure to criminal proceedings. In the present case, however, the trial had remained pending for approximately twelve years, a delay that the Court described as wholly unacceptable and contrary to the statutory objective.
The Court also referred to Section 309 CrPC, which requires criminal trials to proceed from day to day once examination of witnesses has commenced, unless adjournment becomes unavoidable for reasons to be recorded. Justice Nagaprasanna lamented that although adjournments are intended to remain exceptional, they have unfortunately become routine in many criminal courts. Repeated mechanical adjournments, the Court observed, silently contribute to the miscarriage of justice by frustrating the timely completion of trials. The Bench noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against such an "adjournment culture," particularly in cases involving vulnerable victims.
Expressing anguish over the facts of the case, the Court observed that nothing could be more appalling than a prosecution concerning the rape of a six-year-old child remaining pending for twelve long years. The prolonged pendency effectively forced the child to remain connected with the criminal justice process throughout her formative years. The Court remarked that instead of receiving prompt justice and emotional closure, the victim had effectively remained "captive" to the legal system because of institutional delay.
To ensure that no further delay occurred, the High Court directed the Special Court to conclude the trial within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the order. It further directed both the prosecution and the defence to extend complete cooperation in expediting the proceedings. The Court authorized the Special Court to reject unnecessary adjournment requests and to adopt every measure permissible under law to ensure compliance with the timeline. These directions reflect the judiciary's increasing emphasis on strict case management in sensitive criminal prosecutions involving children.
The judgment carries wider significance for the administration of criminal justice under the POCSO Act. It reinforces that statutory timelines prescribed for child sexual offence trials are not merely aspirational but embody an important legislative objective of minimizing secondary victimization. The decision also clarifies the evidentiary principles governing statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC by holding that the absence of a child victim's signature does not invalidate such statements and that Magistrates should not routinely be summoned to prove them.
In conclusion, the Karnataka High Court delivered a strong reminder that speedy justice is an essential component of child protection under the POCSO Act. By criticizing the culture of repeated adjournments, refusing to permit unnecessary procedural delays, and directing the trial to be completed within eight weeks, the Court underscored that the justice system must protect child victims not only through substantive criminal law but also by ensuring prompt, efficient, and trauma-sensitive adjudication. The ruling serves as an important reaffirmation that prolonged delay in POCSO cases undermines both the rights of victims and public confidence in the administration of criminal justice.
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