The Calcutta High Court on August 18, 2026 reserved its order on a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) alleging that police authorities in West Bengal were orally directing mosque committees to remove loudspeakers, even in cases where there was no established violation of the prescribed noise or decibel limits. The matter was heard by a Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Atarup Banerjee. The Court's decision will determine whether the PIL can proceed on the allegations made by the petitioner or whether it should be rejected at the preliminary stage because of deficiencies in the pleadings and supporting material.
The petition was filed as MD Danish Farooqui v. State of West Bengal and Others and was registered as WPA(P) 401 of 2026. The petitioner, a practising advocate, approached the High Court alleging that police authorities had been approaching mosque committees and asking them to remove loudspeakers used for the Azaan. According to the allegations, these directions were communicated orally rather than through a formal written government order, notification or circular. The petitioner claimed that the alleged police action was taking place despite the existence of judicial guidelines governing the permissible use of loudspeakers.
The controversy concerns the legal regulation of loudspeakers and public-address systems. Their use is not completely unrestricted, and authorities can take action when the prescribed noise standards or other applicable conditions are violated. The central grievance in the PIL, however, was that the police were allegedly taking steps to remove loudspeakers without first establishing individual violations of the permissible limits. The petitioner therefore sought judicial intervention to ensure that enforcement of noise-control rules remained within the legal framework rather than becoming an informal or blanket prohibition.
During the hearing, the Advocate General of West Bengal, Surajit Nath Mitra, informed the Division Bench that his instructions were that “nothing was done” by the police authorities. The State therefore disputed the factual foundation of the PIL itself. The Bench questioned the Advocate General about whether even the alleged meetings between police officials and representatives of mosques had taken place. The Advocate General responded in the negative, maintaining that the allegations made by the petitioner were unsupported.
The State also raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the PIL. The Advocate General argued that the petition was based substantially on alleged verbal instructions said to have been issued by unidentified authorities. According to the State, the petitioner had not specified which particular authority had issued the alleged directions. There was also, according to the State's submission, no document establishing that a statutory requirement had been violated. The State therefore characterised the allegations as vague and insufficient to justify judicial intervention through a PIL.
Another argument raised by the State concerned the sources of the information relied upon by the petitioner. The Advocate General pointed out that the petition referred to information allegedly received from Imams and mosque representatives, but none of those persons had personally approached the Court. The State also questioned the reliance placed upon newspaper reports concerning alleged police instructions. According to the State, the petition did not specifically identify police officers who had threatened mosque committees or issued formal directions for removal of loudspeakers.
The State's objection therefore focused largely on the quality and specificity of the pleadings. In ordinary litigation, parties are generally expected to set out specific facts and identify the basis of their claims. The Advocate General argued that PIL proceedings could not be founded merely upon broad or unverified allegations. He also referred to judicial precedents concerning the requirements that must be satisfied before a High Court entertains a PIL. His submission was that the present petition lacked the necessary factual particulars and supporting material.
The Court, however, also examined the substantive issue concerning the regulation of loudspeakers. The Bench referred to an earlier judgment containing guidelines governing their use and observed that police authorities could take action when the prescribed decibel limits were exceeded. The Court sought the State's response to the petitioner's argument that police authorities were allegedly going beyond those parameters. This indicated that the Bench was interested not only in the technical maintainability of the petition but also in understanding whether the alleged police action, if established, would be consistent with the existing legal framework.
Senior Advocate Kalyan Bandopadhyay appeared for the petitioner and strongly opposed the State's maintainability objection. He argued that a PIL should not be treated in exactly the same manner as an ordinary civil or criminal proceeding. Referring to the development of Public Interest Litigation through the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, particularly decisions associated with Justice P.N. Bhagwati, he submitted that PIL proceedings were intended to provide access to justice where a broader public grievance was involved. According to him, the Court should focus on the substance of the grievance rather than insist upon technical standards applicable to conventional adversarial litigation.
Bandopadhyay argued that PIL proceedings were not intended to operate as ordinary adversarial trials requiring every factual allegation to be established through detailed evidence at the initial stage. He submitted that the petition contained a sufficient “skeleton of facts” to justify judicial consideration. His argument was that once a credible public grievance was brought before the Court, the Court could examine the issue and obtain the necessary information from the authorities rather than dismissing the matter merely because individual police officers or affected mosque representatives had not been named.
A major point of disagreement between the parties concerned the absence of mosque representatives or Imams as petitioners or supporting parties. The State repeatedly questioned why the persons allegedly affected by the police action had not themselves approached the Court. Bandopadhyay responded that requiring the Imams or mosque representatives to individually approach the Court would undermine the very nature of a PIL. According to him, if every affected individual had to personally come forward, the proceeding would effectively cease to be a public-interest litigation and become an individual dispute.
The petitioner's counsel also clarified that the grievance was not that mosques possessed an unrestricted right to operate loudspeakers regardless of noise restrictions. Instead, he argued that loudspeakers could be used within the permissible legal limits. His submission was that if a particular mosque violated the prescribed decibel standards or other applicable restrictions, the authorities could take action against that specific violation. However, he contended that the police could not effectively impose a blanket restriction on loudspeakers without identifying an actual violation.
The petitioner further disputed the State's claim that no meetings between police authorities and mosque committees had taken place. Bandopadhyay maintained that such meetings had in fact occurred and that the police had allegedly approached mosque representatives regarding the removal of loudspeakers. He argued that the absence of a formal written order should not prevent the High Court from examining allegations of administrative or police action carried out through oral directions.
At one stage, the Bench observed that the grievance raised by the petitioner needed to be examined and that technical considerations could not necessarily override the substance of a genuine PIL. The Court observed that the grievance had to be considered and that “technicalities cannot be gone into.” This observation was significant because the State's principal objection was based on the lack of specific particulars and documentary material. The Court's remarks suggested that it was conscious of the distinction between ordinary litigation and public-interest proceedings.
Bandopadhyay also relied upon the legal framework governing the use of loudspeakers and submitted that compliance with the Supreme Court's directions should be the determining factor. His argument was that if a mosque used a loudspeaker within the legally permissible limits, the authorities should not interfere merely because the loudspeaker was being used at a place of worship. If a violation occurred, the police could take action against that particular violation through the legal process.
The hearing also involved a discussion about Azaan itself. The Court asked whether the grievance was that the Azaan had actually been stopped, pointing out that the Azaan could still be performed even if loudspeakers were not used. The petitioner, however, clarified that the specific grievance concerned the alleged removal of loudspeakers and not the performance of the religious call to prayer itself. He maintained that the legal issue was whether authorities could remove the equipment without establishing that the permitted noise limits had been breached.
The petitioner also raised the issue of alleged religious discrimination, questioning why police action concerning loudspeakers should be directed against mosques if the governing rules were intended to apply generally. This argument was presented in the context of the petitioner's contention that the applicable noise-control framework should be enforced uniformly and based on objective standards such as decibel limits rather than the identity of the religious institution involved. The State, for its part, disputed that there had been any such targeted police action.
The dispute had come before the High Court earlier in August. On August 13, the same Division Bench had directed the West Bengal Government to obtain instructions on the allegations. During that earlier hearing, the petitioner had claimed that police officers were pressuring mosques across the State to remove loudspeakers and had alleged that the action affected thousands of mosques. The Court had questioned the factual basis for the figure cited by the petitioner and had also sought clarity about the specific interim relief being requested.
During the earlier proceedings, the petitioner had argued that there was no written government order directing the removal of loudspeakers and that police personnel were allegedly implementing oral instructions. He had also relied upon earlier judicial directions concerning the permissible use of loudspeakers and argued that enforcement should be directed against violations of noise limits rather than through a blanket removal of loudspeakers. The State subsequently maintained before the Court that the allegations lacked sufficient particulars.
The issue therefore involves an important intersection between religious freedom, public order, noise pollution regulation and administrative authority. The use of loudspeakers at religious institutions is subject to legal restrictions, and the State possesses regulatory powers to enforce those restrictions. At the same time, any administrative action must remain within the limits of the law and cannot arbitrarily target a particular group or institution. The High Court's consideration of the PIL therefore has implications beyond the individual allegations because it concerns how existing noise-control rules should be implemented by police authorities.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the petitioner sought permission to file a supplementary affidavit containing additional details and material addressing some of the questions raised during the proceedings. The Court, however, indicated that it had already heard the parties and was proceeding to decide the matter. The Bench therefore reserved its order rather than immediately dismissing the petition or granting the relief sought. The eventual order is expected to clarify whether the PIL satisfies the requirements for judicial consideration and, if so, what directions, if any, should be issued to the State authorities.
The High Court's decision is consequently awaited on two interconnected questions. The first is procedural: whether a PIL based on alleged oral police directions, newspaper reports and information from unnamed mosque representatives contains enough factual material to be maintainable. The second concerns the substantive legal issue: whether authorities can remove or direct the removal of loudspeakers without establishing a violation of the prescribed noise limits. The Court's eventual order will be important in determining how these questions are addressed under the existing legal framework.
In conclusion, the Calcutta High Court has reserved its order on the PIL filed by MD Danish Farooqui alleging that police authorities in West Bengal were orally directing mosque committees to remove loudspeakers. The State has denied that such action took place and has challenged the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the allegations are vague and unsupported by specific particulars or documents. The petitioner, represented by Senior Advocate Kalyan Bandopadhyay, has argued that PIL proceedings should focus on the public grievance rather than technical pleading requirements and that loudspeakers should be regulated according to legally prescribed limits rather than removed through informal directions. With the order now reserved, the High Court's forthcoming decision will determine the immediate fate of the PIL and may also clarify the legal limits of police intervention in the regulation of loudspeakers at religious places in West Bengal.
0 Comments
Thank you for your response. It will help us to improve in the future.