The Madras High Court has quashed a criminal case registered against a man who was accused of pelting stones at a pet dog after the animal allegedly bit him. The Court found that there was no material showing that the dog had actually suffered any injury and also found a serious procedural defect in the registration of the criminal case. Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan held that the alleged offence under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act was non-cognisable and that the police were required to obtain prior permission from the jurisdictional court before registering the First Information Report. Since the police failed to follow this mandatory procedure, the Court concluded that the continuation of the criminal proceedings amounted to an abuse of the process of law and quashed the case.
The case arose from a petition filed by Balaji, who approached the Madras High Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated against him by the Peerkankaranai Police Station. The case was registered under Section 11(1)(a) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. Balaji challenged the proceedings on the ground that the allegations did not justify continuation of the criminal prosecution and that the police had also failed to comply with the statutory procedure applicable to a non-cognisable offence. The proceedings were considered by Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan in Crl.O.P. No. 9632 of 2026, titled Balaji v. State and Another.
The allegation against Balaji was that he had pelted stones at a pet dog belonging to Devaraj Manikkam, who was the de facto complainant in the matter. According to the prosecution case, Balaji had allegedly attacked the animal by throwing stones. The allegation consequently resulted in registration of the criminal case under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. However, when the High Court examined the materials placed before it, the Court noticed that there was no evidence establishing that the dog had suffered any injury as a result of the alleged incident. This absence of evidence became one of the circumstances considered by the Court while examining whether the criminal proceedings should be allowed to continue.
The Court also examined the circumstances surrounding the relationship between Balaji and the complainant. The records indicated that both persons were neighbours and had existing enmity between them. The Court noted that, according to Balaji's version, while he was walking on the street, the complainant used to drive his dog towards him with the intention of making the dog bite him. Balaji had allegedly sustained serious injuries because of a dog bite and had himself lodged a police complaint concerning the incident. That complaint was still pending when the case against Balaji was registered.
This background assumed significance because the Court found that the criminal case against Balaji appeared to be a counterblast to the complaint already lodged by him concerning the dog-bite incident. The Court therefore did not view the allegation against Balaji in isolation. Instead, it considered the circumstances in which the complaint had been lodged and the existence of a prior dispute between the parties. The fact that Balaji had himself complained about suffering injuries from the dog was an important circumstance in assessing the subsequent allegation that he had pelted stones at the animal.
Another important factor considered by the High Court was the absence of evidence demonstrating that the dog had actually been injured. Justice Ilanthiraiyan noted that although Balaji was accused of pelting stones at the dog, the materials before the Court did not establish that the animal suffered any injury. In contrast, there was material indicating that Balaji had suffered injuries from the dog bite and that he had approached the police with a complaint. The Court therefore found that the factual circumstances did not justify allowing the criminal proceedings to continue, particularly when the prosecution had also failed to follow the procedure prescribed for a non-cognisable offence.
The procedural issue ultimately became decisive. The Court noted that Section 11(1)(a) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act constitutes a non-cognisable offence. Under the relevant statutory procedure, the police cannot ordinarily investigate or register an FIR for such an offence without obtaining the required permission from the jurisdictional court. The High Court found that this requirement had not been followed in the present case. The police had proceeded to register the case without obtaining prior judicial permission.
The Court specifically referred to Section 31 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, observing that an offence under Section 11(1)(a) falls within the category of non-cognisable offences. Because of this classification, the police were required to obtain prior permission from the jurisdictional court before proceeding with the registration and investigation of the offence. The Court found that the police had failed to obtain such permission. Consequently, the very initiation of the criminal proceedings suffered from a fundamental procedural defect.
The High Court also referred to Section 174(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) in explaining the procedural requirement applicable to the police. The Court observed that the police had registered the FIR without first securing the necessary permission. They subsequently proceeded with the investigation and filed a final report before the trial court. According to the High Court, the trial court also failed to notice this procedural defect and mechanically took cognisance of the matter and issued summons to the accused.
The Court's criticism therefore extended beyond the initial registration of the FIR. The procedural irregularity continued through the subsequent stages of the case. Once the police had proceeded without the legally required prior permission, the final report filed by them was also affected by the defect. The High Court observed that the trial court, while taking cognisance, had failed to examine whether the police had complied with the statutory requirement applicable to a non-cognisable offence. Instead, cognisance was taken and summons were issued without addressing the fundamental procedural issue.
The High Court's decision illustrates the importance of following statutory safeguards even in cases involving relatively minor offences. The fact that the maximum punishment prescribed for the offence was limited did not permit the police to disregard the mandatory procedure. The Court noted that the offence under Section 11(1) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act was non-cognisable and carried a maximum fine of ₹10, which could extend to ₹50. Despite the comparatively minor punishment, the statutory classification of the offence continued to have procedural consequences that the police were required to respect.
The Court's reasoning also demonstrates that criminal procedure cannot be treated as a mere technicality. The requirement of prior judicial permission in respect of a non-cognisable offence serves as an important safeguard against arbitrary criminal investigation and prosecution. When the law requires the police to obtain permission from a court before proceeding, failure to comply with that requirement can affect the validity of the proceedings. In the present case, the High Court found that the police had bypassed this safeguard altogether.
The Court also considered the broader circumstances of the dispute while exercising its jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the criminal process. The existence of prior enmity between the neighbours, the alleged dog-bite suffered by Balaji, his pending complaint against the complainant, and the absence of evidence showing injury to the dog collectively influenced the Court's assessment. These circumstances strengthened the Court's conclusion that the criminal case appeared to have been initiated as a counterblast rather than as a straightforward prosecution arising from an independently established act of animal cruelty.
The judgment therefore rests on both factual and procedural grounds. On the factual side, the Court found no evidence indicating that the dog had been injured by the alleged stone-pelting, while the accused had material supporting his claim that he had been bitten by the animal. On the procedural side, the police had registered the case for a non-cognisable offence without obtaining the required prior permission from the jurisdictional court. The combination of these circumstances led the Court to conclude that continuing the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the legal process.
The High Court consequently allowed Balaji's petition and quashed the criminal case registered against him. The Court held that the proceedings could not be sustained because the police had failed to comply with the statutory requirement before registering the FIR. The trial court's subsequent act of taking cognisance and issuing summons could not cure the foundational procedural defect in the initiation of the case.
The judgment is significant because it reinforces the principle that criminal prosecution must strictly comply with the procedural requirements prescribed by law. Even where the allegation concerns an offence under animal-protection legislation, the police cannot bypass safeguards applicable to non-cognisable offences. The Court's decision does not mean that acts of cruelty against animals cannot be prosecuted. Rather, it emphasises that such prosecution must be initiated and investigated in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the legislature.
The ruling also highlights the High Court's power to intervene where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The Court found that allowing the case to proceed despite the absence of the necessary permission and the factual circumstances surrounding the complaint would not serve the interests of justice. The quashing jurisdiction was therefore exercised to prevent further continuation of proceedings that had been initiated in violation of the applicable legal procedure.
In the present case, the Court did not merely rely upon the allegation that Balaji had thrown stones at the dog. It examined the surrounding circumstances and the materials available on record. The Court found that the prosecution lacked evidence showing injury to the animal, while there was a competing account supported by Balaji's complaint concerning the dog bite. The prior hostility between the parties further raised concerns about the possibility that the criminal case had been filed as retaliation for the earlier complaint.
The decision also sends a message regarding the responsibility of trial courts at the stage of taking cognisance. The High Court noted that the trial court had mechanically taken cognisance and issued summons without noticing that the police had registered the case without obtaining the necessary permission. Judicial scrutiny at the cognisance stage is therefore important, particularly where the statute expressly requires prior authorisation before the police can investigate a non-cognisable offence.
In conclusion, the Madras High Court has quashed the criminal case against Balaji, who was accused of pelting stones at a dog that allegedly bit him. Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan found that there was no evidence indicating that the dog had suffered any injury and noted that Balaji himself had suffered injuries from the dog bite and had already lodged a police complaint. The Court also found that the parties were neighbours with previous enmity and that the prosecution appeared to be a counterblast to Balaji's complaint. Most importantly, the Court held that the offence under Section 11(1)(a) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act was non-cognisable and that the police were required to obtain prior permission from the jurisdictional court before registering the FIR. Since this mandatory requirement was ignored, the police proceeded illegally, filed a final report, and the trial court mechanically took cognisance. The High Court consequently held that continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law and quashed the case.
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