The Supreme Court has held that a Magistrate may lawfully direct the collection of voice samples from witnesses, not merely from accused persons, affirming that such direction does not infringe Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The Court explained that voice samples—as well as fingerprints, handwriting samples, or DNA—are material evidence rather than testimonial evidence, and therefore lie outside the ambit of the protection against self-incrimination. In doing so, the Court drew upon the precedent set in Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2019), which recognized that even absent a specific statutory provision in the Criminal Procedure Code, a Judicial Magistrate may direct a “person” (not limited to an accused) to provide a voice sample for criminal investigation.
The case before the Court involved a 2021 incident in which a young woman died, giving rise to cross-allegations between her family and her in-laws. During the investigation, the police sought a voice sample from one of the key witnesses—who was alleged to have acted as an agent for the deceased’s father and had threatened another witness—to match with recorded conversations. A Magistrate granted the request, but the witness challenged this order at the Calcutta High Court, which struck it down on the ground that the question of authority to issue such direction was pending before a larger bench of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision, observing that the pendency of a reference to a larger bench cannot negate the binding force of Ritesh Sinha. The bench, consisting of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, emphasized that Ritesh Sinha did not refer only to accused persons but used the broader terminology of a “person,” thereby extending the magistrate’s power to witnesses as well. The Court noted that the essence of Article 20(3) is protection against testimonial compulsion, and material evidence like voice samples does not amount to testimony.
Addressing statutory backing, the Court remarked that Section 349 of the BNSS explicitly contemplates magistrates directing voice sample collection. Even where BNSS does not apply, the Court affirmed that the broader principle remains that collecting a voice sample is akin to collecting physical evidence, not compelling testimonial evidence. The Court held that providing a voice sample does not in itself incriminate; it is only through comparison with investigatory material that such evidence might be linked to culpability.
The appeal was thus allowed, and the magistrate’s order directing the witness to furnish a voice sample was upheld. The Supreme Court’s ruling clarifies that investigative agencies may rely on magistrate-directed voice sampling from witnesses—not just the accused—without violating constitutional safeguards against self-incrimination.
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