The Supreme Court, responding to a set of constitutional questions referred through a Presidential Reference under Article 143, delivered an authoritative interpretation on the scope and limits of the powers of Governors and the President in granting assent to bills. The judgment arose in the backdrop of repeated disputes between State governments and Governors regarding prolonged delays and non-action on bills duly passed by State legislatures. The Court was asked to clarify whether constitutional functionaries such as Governors and the President could be subjected to a fixed timeline for granting assent, and whether prolonged silence or inaction could automatically be construed as “deemed assent.” The Constitution Bench, comprising five judges, undertook a detailed examination of Articles 200 and 201 and the structure of legislative procedure under the Constitution, ultimately concluding that neither the Governor nor the President can be compelled to act within fixed judicially imposed timelines, and that the Constitution does not recognise or permit any doctrine of deemed assent. At the same time, the Court clarified that, in exceptional cases of prolonged or unreasonable delay, judicial review in the form of a limited mandamus remains available to ensure that constitutional obligations are not indefinitely frustrated.
The Court began by emphasising the unique constitutional role of the Governor and the President in the legislative process. Under Articles 200 and 201, when a bill is presented to the Governor, several options are available. The Governor may grant assent, withhold assent, return the bill to the legislature for reconsideration (except in the case of money bills), or reserve it for the consideration of the President. Similarly, under Article 201, the President may assent to a bill reserved by the Governor, withhold assent, or return it for reconsideration. The Court noted that these provisions are structurally designed to incorporate democratic checks and balances, and they assign the Governor and the President a constitutional responsibility that cannot be reduced to a mere procedural formality. Therefore, any interpretation that attempts to judicially curtail or direct the exercise of these options would be contrary to the constitutional scheme.
Turning to the question of timelines, the Court stated unequivocally that the Constitution does not prescribe a time limit for Governors or the President to exercise their assent powers. The Bench held that it would be impermissible for the judiciary to read into the constitutional text any artificially imposed deadline, as doing so would amount to rewriting the Constitution rather than interpreting it. The absence of timelines, the Court reasoned, is not an oversight; rather, it reflects the framers’ intentional decision to vest these constitutional authorities with a degree of discretion. Imposing judicially crafted deadlines would interfere with the separation of powers, as the Court would effectively be regulating the internal functioning of high constitutional offices.
In addressing the idea of “deemed assent,” the Court was equally categorical. It held that the notion of a bill automatically acquiring the force of law due to inaction by the Governor or the President is entirely alien to the Constitution. The legislative process, as laid out under Articles 200 and 201, requires an active decision—assent, withholding, returning, or reserving—and not passive acquiescence. Declaring that inaction can be translated into assent would undermine the discretionary power vested in the Governor or the President and improperly allow legislative outcomes to emerge without the constitutionally required executive consideration. Such a doctrine, the Court warned, would not only distort the constitutional procedure but also create administrative uncertainty and weaken the structural safeguards embedded within the legislative scheme.
While emphasising the absence of mandatory timelines, the Court also acknowledged that constitutional discretion cannot become a shield for indefinite inaction. It recognised that situations may arise in which a Governor fails to act on a bill for an unreasonably long period, effectively stalling the legislature’s functioning and potentially paralysing governance. In such cases, the Court held that judicial review is not completely excluded. It noted that courts may in exceptional circumstances issue a limited mandamus, directing the Governor to take a decision—without dictating what that decision should be. The distinction, the Court stressed, lies between compelling the exercise of power and compelling a particular outcome. Judicial intervention remains permissible only to the extent of ensuring that constitutional duties are performed, not to influence or override the content of the decision.
The Court also revisited previous judicial pronouncements that touched upon timelines for Governors. It clarified that earlier observations suggesting that a Governor must act “as soon as possible” or “within a reasonable time” cannot be construed as judicially fixed deadlines. Rather, such phrases were contextual reminders of the constitutional expectation of promptness, not enforceable time-bound directives. The Court cautioned that its opinion in the present reference should not be misinterpreted as reopening or overturning prior judgments where the Court intervened in cases of extreme delays. Instead, the present ruling was confined to answering the precise questions posed in the reference, reaffirming existing constitutional principles while providing clarity on the limits of judicial intervention.
Another important issue addressed by the Bench was whether Governors and the President always act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers while granting assent. The Court held that their role under Articles 200 and 201 involves a measure of constitutional discretion. While the general rule is that the Governor acts on ministerial advice, there are certain contexts—such as reserving a bill for the President—where discretion exists. The Court reiterated that this discretion is not absolute and remains subject to constitutional limitations, but cannot be interpreted as being fully overridden by ministerial directions. The exercise of discretion in these scenarios is an intrinsic part of the constitutional design and must be respected.
The Court also addressed the interplay between the legislative process and federal tensions. It recognised that disputes between State governments and Governors regarding assent have become increasingly frequent, often leading to political stand-offs. However, the Court maintained that the solution does not lie in judicially altering constitutional procedures but in adherence to constitutional morality and cooperative governance. The Bench emphasised that all constitutional functionaries must act in good faith and with an awareness of their responsibilities within a democratic framework. Delays should not be weaponised to obstruct legislation, nor should constitutional authorities be pressured through litigation to abandon their discretionary role.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s judgment attempts to balance constitutional discretion with democratic accountability. It affirms that Governors and the President are not bound by fixed timelines in granting assent and that the Constitution does not permit the concept of deemed assent. At the same time, it leaves room for judicial oversight only in cases where inaction becomes so prolonged or unreasonable that it obstructs the functioning of government. The decision emphasises fidelity to constitutional text, respect for separation of powers, and the need for constitutional authorities to act responsibly within the framework of democratic governance.
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