The Delhi High Court is set to consider the maintainability of a petition filed by Sukesh Chandrashekhar seeking deletion of certain remarks from a trial court judgment that convicted him for impersonating a Supreme Court Judge and attempting to pressurise a judicial officer to grant favourable orders in his case. Chandrashekhar has described the remarks made against him in the judgment as “derogatory” and has approached the High Court seeking their setting aside or deletion. The petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The State has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition, contending that Chandrashekhar cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court after he has already been convicted and sentenced by the trial court. The High Court, at this stage, has not examined the substance of Chandrashekhar's grievance and has confined the proceedings to the preliminary question of whether his petition can be entertained in the first place.
The matter was considered by Justice Madhu Jain, who listed the case for hearing on the question of maintainability. The Court directed that arguments on this preliminary issue be heard before it considers the substantive grievance raised by Chandrashekhar. The State's objection is based on the fact that the trial court has already convicted and sentenced him in the criminal case. According to the State, once the criminal proceedings have culminated in conviction and sentence, Chandrashekhar cannot use a petition under Article 226 to challenge adverse observations contained in the judgment. The maintainability objection therefore forms the first issue that the High Court will have to determine.
Chandrashekhar has taken a different position before the High Court. He has submitted that other criminal trials against him are still pending and has sought judicial intervention against the remarks contained in the judgment in the case in which he was convicted. His plea is specifically directed at the observations that he considers derogatory. Through the petition, he is seeking the setting aside or deletion of those observations. His case is therefore not presently before the High Court as an appeal against the conviction itself, but as a challenge concerning the language and adverse remarks recorded by the trial court in its judgment.
The criminal case in which the remarks were made concerned allegations that Chandrashekhar impersonated the private secretary of a sitting Supreme Court Judge and subsequently impersonated the Judge himself. According to the case referred to in the proceedings, calls were made to a judicial officer in an attempt to secure favourable orders in Chandrashekhar's case. The trial court considered the conduct attributed to him while recording his conviction and made strong observations regarding the manner in which he allegedly attempted to influence the judicial process. These observations have now become the subject matter of his petition before the High Court.
The allegations concerning impersonation involved the use of false identities connected with the higher judiciary. Chandrashekhar had allegedly first represented himself as the private secretary of a sitting Supreme Court Judge and subsequently as the Judge himself. The purpose of the alleged communications was to attempt to influence a judicial officer in relation to the grant of bail. The trial court considered the alleged conduct to be particularly serious because it involved an attempt to interfere with the judicial process by falsely assuming the identity of persons occupying positions within the higher judiciary.
While convicting Chandrashekhar, the trial court made extensive observations about the nature of the conduct attributed to him. The judgment referred to the history of deception associated with his alleged activities and distinguished the alleged impersonation of a Supreme Court Judge or the Judge's secretary from other forms of deception. The trial court considered the alleged attempt to influence judicial proceedings to have a particularly serious character because it was directed at the functioning of the justice system itself.
The trial court observed that deception by persons who mislead businessmen, companies, investors or members of the public had been seen in various forms. However, it considered the alleged conduct in the case before it to be different because, according to the court, Chandrashekhar's objective was to alter the course of judicial proceedings. The judgment described the alleged conduct as an especially serious form of deception because the alleged impersonation was directed toward influencing a judicial officer and obtaining a favourable outcome in a legal proceeding.
The trial court also referred to allegations that Chandrashekhar had previously engaged in spoofing caller IDs and impersonating Union Ministers, as well as convincing individuals that he possessed access to influential circles. The court used these circumstances while making observations about the manner in which he allegedly conducted himself. According to the trial court's judgment, the alleged conduct reflected an attempt to create the impression of possessing influence and authority that he did not actually possess.
The trial court further observed that Chandrashekhar appeared to have become convinced of the credibility of the false image that he allegedly created through his impersonations. It stated that the alleged conduct was based on the belief that a sufficiently elaborate or audacious falsehood could cause the rule of law to yield. The trial court contrasted ordinary forms of deception motivated by financial gain with the alleged impersonation of a Supreme Court Judge or the Judge's secretary, which it characterised as an attack on the institutional functioning of the judiciary.
These observations are now being challenged by Chandrashekhar before the Delhi High Court. His grievance is that certain portions of the trial court's judgment are derogatory and should be removed. The petition therefore asks the High Court to intervene in relation to the remarks even though the underlying criminal case has already resulted in conviction and sentence. The State has questioned whether such a challenge is legally maintainable under Article 226 in these circumstances.
The State's objection focuses on the procedural stage at which Chandrashekhar has approached the High Court. According to the State, the trial court has already reached a conclusion against him and has convicted and sentenced him. Therefore, the State contends that the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked to seek deletion of adverse remarks after the conclusion of the criminal trial. The State has accordingly asked the High Court to reject the petition at the threshold on the ground of maintainability.
Chandrashekhar, however, has relied upon the fact that other criminal proceedings against him remain pending. He has sought the High Court's intervention against the remarks on the basis that they could have implications beyond the particular case in which they were made. His petition asks the Court to examine the observations independently of the conviction and to remove the remarks that he considers derogatory. The High Court has not yet determined whether this argument is sufficient to permit the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
The Court has consequently separated the question of maintainability from the merits of Chandrashekhar's grievance. At the present stage, the High Court has not held that the remarks are justified or unjustified, nor has it ordered their deletion. It has also not examined whether the trial court was entitled to make the observations in the form in which they appear in the judgment. Instead, the Court will first hear the parties on whether the petition itself can be entertained under Article 226 after the petitioner's conviction and sentence.
The distinction is significant in the present proceedings because Chandrashekhar is not merely challenging a factual statement in the trial court judgment. His petition concerns remarks that he describes as derogatory and seeks their removal from a judgment that has already recorded his conviction. The State's preliminary objection therefore requires the High Court to determine whether a person who has already been convicted and sentenced can separately invoke the constitutional writ jurisdiction to challenge adverse observations contained in that judgment.
The High Court's proceedings arise from W.P.(CRL) 2607/2026, Sukash Chandrashekhar @ Sukesh v. The State NCT of Delhi. Justice Madhu Jain is hearing the matter. The case has been listed for arguments on maintainability, with the Court yet to consider the merits of the petitioner's request for deletion of the remarks.
The trial court's observations were made in the context of the conduct for which Chandrashekhar was convicted. The court specifically focused on the alleged impersonation of a Supreme Court Judge and the Judge's private secretary, as well as the alleged attempts to influence a judicial officer in order to secure favourable orders concerning bail. The remarks challenged before the High Court were therefore part of the trial court's discussion of the conduct that it considered while deciding the criminal case.
The trial court distinguished the alleged impersonation of a Supreme Court Judge from other alleged forms of impersonation attributed to Chandrashekhar. According to the observations reproduced in the proceedings, the court regarded impersonation of a bureaucrat or political intermediary as a form of transactional wrongdoing, whereas impersonating a Supreme Court Judge or the Judge's secretary was viewed as an act directed against the institutional authority of the judicial system. This distinction formed an important part of the strong language used in the judgment.
Chandrashekhar's present petition does not ask the High Court at this preliminary stage to reconsider the evidence that resulted in his conviction. Instead, the petition is directed toward the adverse remarks contained in the judgment. He wants the remarks that he considers derogatory to be set aside or deleted. The State, however, maintains that the route chosen by him is not available after conviction and sentencing, making maintainability the immediate issue before the Court.
The High Court has therefore not granted the relief sought by Chandrashekhar at this stage. No direction has been issued for deletion of the remarks, and the Court has not ruled upon whether the observations made by the trial court were improper. The matter remains at the preliminary stage, where the parties will address the legal question concerning the availability of Article 226 jurisdiction after a criminal conviction and sentence.
The Court's eventual determination on maintainability will precede any examination of the substantive grievance. If the petition is found maintainable, the High Court may then consider Chandrashekhar's request concerning the remarks. If it is found not maintainable, the petition would not proceed to a merits-based examination of whether the observations should be deleted. The present order therefore leaves both the maintainability issue and the substantive grievance open.
The proceedings thus centre on the competing positions of Chandrashekhar and the State regarding the scope of the High Court's constitutional writ jurisdiction following a criminal conviction. Chandrashekhar seeks removal of remarks that he considers derogatory and points to the continuing pendency of other criminal trials against him. The State argues that the conviction and sentence already recorded by the trial court prevent him from invoking Article 226 for this purpose. The Delhi High Court has reserved consideration of the preliminary issue and will hear the arguments on maintainability before deciding whether the petition can proceed further.
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