The Supreme Court refused to entertain a plea filed by seven Family Court judges from Maharashtra seeking a declaration that they hold “judicial office” for the purpose of determining their eligibility for appointment as High Court judges under Article 217 of the Constitution. A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana held that the issue had already been conclusively considered by the Supreme Court in its earlier judgment in S.D. Joshi and Others v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay and Another, in which the Court had held that a Family Court judge belonging to a separate cadre could not be treated as holding a “judicial office” for the purposes of Article 217(2)(a). The petitioners asked the Court to reconsider that position on the ground that circumstances concerning the appointment of Family Court judges in Maharashtra had changed, but the Bench found that the present petition essentially sought a review or recall of the earlier judgment through a writ petition under Article 32.
The seven petitioners were Family Court judges appointed under the Family Courts Recruitment Rules in Maharashtra. Their case was that they should be recognised as holding judicial office for the limited purpose of determining their eligibility for elevation to the High Court. According to the submissions made before the Supreme Court, all seven petitioners had completed more than seven years of service, while the first four had completed at least ten years as Family Court judges. Some of the petitioners had spent as many as 26 years in judicial service, initially serving as subordinate judges and subsequently functioning as Family Court judges. They therefore sought recognition of their service as Family Court judges for the eligibility requirement under Article 217.
Senior Advocate R Basant, appearing for the petitioners, argued that the matter involved an interpretation of Article 217 of the Constitution. He explained that the petitioners had approached the Supreme Court directly because the earlier decision in S.D. Joshi stood in their way before the High Court. According to him, the issue could not be effectively pursued before the High Court because the Supreme Court had already interpreted the expression “judicial office” in the context of Family Court judges. Justice Joymalya Bagchi immediately pointed out that the earlier judgment clearly answered the question against the petitioners. Basant accepted that the earlier ruling was against his clients but argued that it deserved reconsideration because of subsequent factual developments.
The principal change relied upon by the petitioners concerned the manner in which Family Court judges had been appointed in Maharashtra. Basant referred to information reported by the Maharashtra High Court indicating that for the preceding 36 years, no person from outside the judicial service had been recruited as a Family Court judge in the State. According to him, the judges appointed during that period had either been judicial officers or advocates who possessed the required service and standing at the Bar. He submitted that these persons had undergone the required examination and had been appointed as judges of Family Courts, meaning that they had always been officers belonging to the judicial service.
Basant argued that this changed factual position was significant because the earlier judgment in S.D. Joshi had considered, among other things, the statutory possibility of appointing persons who were not members of the regular judicial service as Family Court judges. His submission was that the reasoning in the earlier judgment had been influenced by that possibility. Since, according to the petitioners, Maharashtra had not actually appointed anyone from such an outside source for 36 years, he contended that the factual foundation underlying the earlier distinction had changed. On that basis, he argued that there was no longer justification for denying Family Court judges recognition as holders of judicial office for the limited purpose of Article 217.
The petitioners also relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Rejanish v. Deepa. Basant referred to that judgment in the course of arguing that there was no disqualification preventing Family Court judges from appearing for selection as District Judges. However, Chief Justice Surya Kant pointed out that the Rejanish decision did not deal with the interpretation of Article 217. Basant accepted that it did not directly address the question before the Bench. He explained that his argument was instead based specifically on Article 217(2)(a), which deals with the qualifications for appointment as a High Court judge and permits eligibility to be established through the relevant period of practice at the Bar or service in a judicial office.
Basant submitted that the expression “judicial office” had been interpreted restrictively in S.D. Joshi. According to him, the earlier judgment had compared the functions of Family Court judges with those of judges belonging to the regular District Judge cadre and had concluded that the two were not equivalent. He argued that this comparison should be reconsidered because the manner in which Family Court judges were appointed and functioned in Maharashtra had evolved. His contention was that, for the limited purpose of Article 217, the Court should focus on the fact that the petitioners were judicial officers who had been appointed through the judicial recruitment process and had spent substantial periods performing judicial functions.
The Chief Justice, during the hearing, also raised a broader issue concerning the existence of a separate cadre for Family Court judges in Maharashtra. The Court noted that in many other States, Family Court judges are drawn from the regular judicial service and are posted to Family Courts on deputation. In such cases, the judges retain their status as judicial officers and can subsequently return to the mainstream judicial cadre. The Chief Justice observed that the difficulty in Maharashtra appeared to arise from the creation of an exclusive and separate cadre for Family Court judges.
The Bench noted that the petitioners' argument appeared, in substance, to be connected with the question of whether the separate Family Court cadre should eventually be merged with the mainstream judicial cadre. Basant acknowledged that a request for such a merger had also been made in the earlier S.D. Joshi proceedings, but he maintained that the present petition was narrower. He stated that he was not asking the Court to order the merger of the cadres. Instead, his limited request was that a person holding the post of Family Court judge should be regarded as holding judicial office for the specific purpose of Article 217.
The Chief Justice responded that the situation was different in most States because Family Court judges generally come from the District Judge cadre and are deputed to Family Courts. Such judges do not lose their status as judicial officers when they are posted to Family Courts and therefore remain within the framework relevant to Article 217(2)(a). The Bench's observations highlighted the distinction between a Family Court judge who remains part of the regular judicial service and one who belongs to a separate Family Court cadre. The petitioners, according to the Court, were seeking recognition despite their placement in the separate cadre established in Maharashtra.
The Supreme Court repeatedly questioned whether the circumstances had changed sufficiently, either legally or factually, to justify reconsidering S.D. Joshi. The Chief Justice observed that unless there had been a relevant change in the law or the facts, there was no apparent reason to revisit the issue. He again noted that Rejanish did not deal with the question of Article 217. The petitioners accepted this position but continued to rely upon the changed circumstances concerning the recruitment of Family Court judges in Maharashtra.
The Bench further observed that accepting the petitioners' request would effectively require the Supreme Court to question the correctness of S.D. Joshi. Justice Bagchi explained that a petition under Article 32 could proceed on this basis only if the Bench was prepared to doubt the ratio of the earlier judgment with a view to reconsidering or overruling it. He asked the petitioners to identify a contrary judgment or an alternative interpretation of Article 217 that had not been considered in S.D. Joshi. The petitioners did not place before the Bench such a contrary interpretation capable of displacing the earlier precedent.
Justice Bagchi also pointed out that S.D. Joshi had undertaken a detailed comparison between the functions performed by judges belonging to the regular District Judge cadre and those performed by Family Court judges. The earlier judgment had concluded that the functions were not equivalent for the purpose under consideration. The Bench further noted that the earlier decision had considered Family Courts in the broader context of specialised adjudicatory bodies and tribunals before reaching its conclusion concerning the status of Family Court judges.
The Supreme Court also considered the possibility of addressing the issue administratively rather than through a constitutional challenge to the earlier precedent. The Bench suggested that if the separate Family Court cadre was creating the difficulty, the petitioners could approach the Maharashtra High Court and the State Government regarding the structure and rules governing Family Court appointments. The Court observed that, where a separate Family Court cadre exists, a policy decision could potentially be taken to abolish that separate cadre and permit Family Court postings to be made from among members of the higher judicial service.
The Chief Justice questioned why the State Government and the High Court could not consider reworking the relevant rules in consultation with each other. Basant, however, argued that the existing interpretation in S.D. Joshi prevented the High Court from taking such a step without the Supreme Court first revisiting the earlier judgment. The Chief Justice disagreed with that approach and asked counsel to consider the actual requirements contained in the applicable statutory provisions. The discussion therefore shifted between the constitutional eligibility issue and the administrative structure through which Family Court judges were appointed in Maharashtra.
Basant then submitted that the relevant provisions contemplated a person being a District Judge or being capable of being appointed as a District Judge and did not expressly require the person to be equivalent to a District Judge. According to his submission, the fundamental requirement was seven years' experience as a judicial officer or seven years' standing as an advocate. He again emphasised that although certain other categories of government officers could technically be appointed to Family Courts, Maharashtra had not made appointments from those categories for 36 years. He relied on this factual position to argue that the actual character of the Family Court judges in Maharashtra had become substantially different from the circumstances considered in the earlier precedent.
The Supreme Court ultimately declined to entertain the writ petition. In its order, the Bench held that the question raised by the petitioners had already been answered against them in S.D. Joshi. The Court characterised the present Article 32 petition as essentially seeking a review or recall of the earlier judgment. It held that a writ petition under Article 32 was not the appropriate recourse for seeking such a review of a judgment of the Supreme Court. The Bench therefore declined to interfere with the existing legal position.
The Court further held that the petitioners had not established a case within the existing legal framework warranting interference. Their reliance on the changed circumstances in Maharashtra was not considered sufficient to reopen the earlier interpretation. The Bench did not accept that the absence of appointments from outside the judicial service during the preceding 36 years, by itself, provided a basis for reconsidering the binding precedent. The earlier conclusion concerning Family Court judges belonging to a separate cadre therefore remained undisturbed.
At the same time, the Court did not leave the structural issue entirely unaddressed. It suggested that the petitioners could approach the concerned High Court and the State Government for consideration of changes to the rules governing appointments to Family Courts. The Court noted that the arrangements followed in other States could also be considered in this context. According to the Bench, the question of changing the structure of the separate Family Court cadre was essentially a matter of policy that could be considered by the High Court and the State Government in consultation with each other.
The Supreme Court's order therefore maintained the distinction established in S.D. Joshi between judges belonging to the regular judicial cadre and judges appointed to a separate Family Court cadre. For the purpose of Article 217(2)(a), the latter cannot claim recognition as holding judicial office merely on the basis of their service as Family Court judges. The Court refused to revisit this position through the Article 32 petition filed by the seven Maharashtra Family Court judges.
The proceedings were registered as Indrakala Joginder Nanda v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, D No. 38854/2026. The matter was considered by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana. The petitioners had sought recognition of their Family Court service for eligibility for appointment as High Court judges under Article 217, relying particularly on the manner of appointments in Maharashtra and their long judicial service. The Supreme Court declined to entertain the challenge because the issue was already governed by the earlier precedent and the petition, in substance, sought its review or recall.
The Court's decision consequently leaves the existing position under S.D. Joshi intact while indicating that any structural change concerning a separate Family Court cadre could be pursued through the administrative and policy mechanisms of the State Government and the High Court. The petitioners' request for judicial recognition of their Family Court posts as “judicial office” for Article 217 purposes was not accepted, and the Supreme Court declined to reopen the earlier ruling in the absence of a sufficient legal or factual basis for doing so.
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